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We present a method that analyzes a person’s negotiation behavior
to automatically detect co-occurrence of tactics and combination
of tactics (i.e., negotiation styles). We first identify action features
consistent with use of the common negotiation tactics based on
prior research in negotiation. Next, we apply regularized linear
regression over a negotiation dataset to assess how effective par-
ticular tactics are in predicting the negotiation outcome. Finally,
we use a supervised variant of a topic model to derive effective
negotiation styles. Results from the clusters produced by the topic
models provide insights regarding the effectiveness of negotiation
styles that people utilize.
KEYWORDS
Explainability in human-agent systems; Socially interactive agents;
Agents competing and collaborating with humans
ACM Reference Format:
Yuyu Xu, David Jeong, Pedro Sequeira, Jonathan Gratch, Javed Aslam,
and Stacy Marsella. 2020. A Supervised Topic Model Approach to Learning
Effective Styles within Human-Agent Negotiation. In Proc. of the 19th Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2020), Auckland, New Zealand, May 9–13, 2020, IFAAMAS, 3 pages.
1 INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of bounded resources, whether it is constraints
on our time, actions, material things, or space. Due to these con-
straints, conflicts between people naturally follow. Negotiation
plays a central role to resolve these conflicts, in both our profes-
sional and personal lives. Not surprisingly, this has led to a wide
range of research on computationally modeling negotiation. Model-
ing how people negotiate in a negotiation interaction poses multiple
challenges. First, negotiation is a complex, highly dynamic social
interaction [6]. Second, different people might use different tactics
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during a negotiation interaction [13, 15], some of them may be
more effective than others.
In the work reported here, we look at the question of how nego-
tiators may employ multiple tactics over the course of a negotiation.
Specifically, we ask the question of what tactics tend to occur in a
single negotiation as part of an overall strategy and what particular
combination of tactics were successful. We call such combination of
tactics negotiation styles. A three step process is proposed to answer
this broad question, they are: identifying tactic-related features;
assessing tactic-related features and learning effective negotiation
styles, as elaborated below.
2 AUTOMATIC DETECTION PROCESS
The dataset used in this work is described briefly, followed by the
three step processes.
Negotiation Dataset. We adopt the dataset from [10], which was
collected through the IAGO framework [9] and contains 504 negoti-
ation sessions (maximum length being 10minutes), each between a
human participant and an agent. Each human participant was lim-
ited to one negotiation with 1 of the 8 agent types, differing across
the three dimensions, namely cognitive bias, anchoring, emotion.
The two parties negotiate over 4 items, each with different
amounts and assigned payoffs. At the end of each turn, both parties
get the payoffs for the items in their hand, which defines the ne-
gotiation outcome. To reflect some of the complexity of real world
negotiation, Iago framework supports many different combinations
of actions. For example, an offer is a partial split between four items
that may occur simultaneously. Preference is communicated with
Q&A, such as “do you like x better than y?". Verbal influence is
conveyed by sending positive messages (“it is important that we
are both happy with an agreement") or negative messages (“your
offer sucks"). Emotional information is communicated via selection
of emoticons on the interface. Finally, agreement is determined by
participants’ acceptance of the offer by both (formal agreement) or
one party (non-binding agreement).
2.1 Identifying Tactic-related Features
To identify tactic-related features, we propose a compact annotation
schema inspired by negotiation literature designed which here we
use to quantify the sequences of negotiation action in the IAGO





𝑐7 (𝑤 = 0.39) 𝑐5 (𝑤 = −0.38) 𝑐0 (𝑤 = 0.26) 𝑐8 (𝑤 = −0.25) 𝑐6 (𝑤 = −0.12)
Tactics
Preference_ask:0.32 Logrolling_h_lt_a:0.18 Logrolling_h_gt_a:0.28 NonbindingAgreement_reject:0.23 Emotion_neutral:0.27
Preference_tell:0.15 Preference_tell:0.16 Preference_ask:0.13 MultiIssue_true:0.16 Preference_misclick:0.25
Emotion_happy:0.15 Logrolling_h_eq_a:0.12 NonbindingAgreement_reject:0.11 Verbal_positive:0.13 Emotion_angry:0.10











𝑐8 (𝑤 = 0.33) 𝑐5 (𝑤 = 0.31) 𝑐1 (𝑤 = 0.17) 𝑐6 (𝑤 = 0.11) 𝑐9 (𝑤 = −0.07)
Tactics
Preference_ask:0.53 Preference_ask:0.17 Verbal_positive:0.16 MultiIssue_true:0.35 Emotion_happy:0.21
Preference_tell:0.19 Preference_tell:0.17 Emotion_surprised:0.15 Preference_tell:0.13 Verbal_positive:0.15
Emotion_happy:0.18 Verbal_positive:0.11 Concession_above_avg:0.15 Preference_ask:0.10 Emotion_neutral:0.10






change_Positive_Strong" “Positive_Concession_Above" “PreferenceExchange_MultiIssue" “Positive"
Table 1: Supervised LDA produced tactics cluster based on human side tactic-related features.
three consecutive actions are referred to as a trigram, e.g., consisting
of an offer, a counter-offer, and another offer of the first negotiator.
We assume that each tactic may potentially be realized by behavior
patterns of unigrams or trigrams, i.e., tactic-related features. Table 2
provides detailed descriptions of the data schema and relates tactics
based on relevant theories to classes of discretized actions.
Our annotation schema connects tactics with particular actions
and interpret the results. Specifically, each tactic is realized by a set
of tactic-related features. E.g., tactic Emotion Expressivity comprises
a set of features {Happy, Sad, Neutral, Surprise, Angry}, each of
which is realized by the behavior patterns of unigrams communi-
cated across different channels. E.g., feature Happy is realized by
counting the occurrences of unigram “sending an happy emoticon",
conveyed during a negotiation through the emotion channel.
2.2 Assessing Tactic-related Features
We adopt a supervised learning model, where the features for this
model are the occurrences of each distinct sub-sequence (unigrams
or trigrams, from human side or both sides), and the labels are
either human outcome or joint outcome. Specifically, we used Linear
Regression with ElasticNet [16] regularizer, as an effective solution
Tactics based on Relevant Theories Tactic-related Features Actions
Concession in Offer [1] Concession_below_avg offer_one_sided:below_avg
Concession_avg offer_one_sided:avg
Concession_above_avg offer_one_sided:above_avg
















Verbal Influence [12] Verbal_positive verbal_influence:positive
Verbal_negative verbal_influence:negative










Anchoring [2] Anchoring_size offer_one_sided:initial_payoff
Nonbinding Agreement Nonbinding_accept agreement:nonbinding_accept
Nonbinding_reject agreement:nonbinding_reject
Table 2: Data schema. Nonbinding Agreement (last row) is
based on observational heuristics of the IAGO dataset. (“h":
human, “a": agent, “avg": average, “lt": less than, “gt": greater
than, “eq": equal).
to tackle the challenge that the feature matrix might be sparse.
The feature matrix is composed of the occurrences of distinct sub-
sequences within a single negotiation sequence and some of them
might be non-existent given how rich this dataset is. To train model,
we use K-folds cross-validation (𝐾 = 10) and model selection.
2.3 Learning Effective Negotiation Styles
After identifying the most predictive features, we can determine
what negotiation styles exist, as well as their effectiveness. To
achieve that, we resorted to a topic model, using a well-established
solution: Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [3],where the features
are the occurrences of each distinct sub-sequence, and the labels cor-
respond to the outcomes (human, joint). LDA is a natural language
processing-based probabilistic unsupervised learning method for
modeling topics. This model assumes a generative process, where
each document (in our case a negotiation sequence) in a corpus
(i.e., all negotiation sequences) is composed of collections of words
or phrases (sub-sequences), each generated from multiple underly-
ing topics (clusters of the distinct sub-sequences). The underlying
assumption of LDA fits our objective of automatically clustering
features, where the clusters characterize styles of the negotiation.
To address the limited effectiveness of capturing relations between
clusters and outcomes using (unsupervised) LDA, we also adopted
its supervised variant (sLDA) [4, 8].
3 DEMONSTRATION
Our results show that the identified tactic-related features are able
to achieve a much higher performance in outcome prediction as
compared to the random guess baseline (up to 30% boost). This
demonstrates that we could systematically acquire a predictive set
of tactic-related features. Furthermore, our models can characterize
the distinguishing negotiation styles through co-occurrences of the
tactics, as well as show how effective these clusters are in terms
of predicting outcome (see Table 1). For example, one produced
cluster reveals the negotiation style called “Aggressive" because it
contains tactics: log-rolls where human gets more payoff as compared
to agent; human asks issue preference from the agent; human reject
agent’s offer and human showing angry emoticon. These tactics
combined suggest an aggressive strategy. This “Aggressive" style
has a positive effect on human’s negotiation outcome (i.e., human
adopting aggressive strategy could end up having more payoff).
Although our techniques were applied to a particular human-agent
dataset, we see the approach to be more broadly applicable to
human-human interactions.
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